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Eavesdropping as Rhetorical Tactic:
History, Whiteness, and Rhetoric
Krista Ratcliffe

Man is a broken creature.... It is his nature as a human being
to be so; but it is also his nature to create relationships that can
span the brokenness. This is his first responsibility; when he
fails, he is inevitably destroyed.
-Lillian Smith

At a cocktail party at the ecce convention in 1997, I overheard a male
voice say, "I guess it's hip to be a white guy again, huh?" I immediately
wondered, "How did whiteness become a hip topic at cocktail parties?
And does he think it's hip to be a white' gal' too?" After returning home,
I continued to wonder about what his words implied. How does history
function so as to make such comments possible? What exactly does it
mean to be "a white guy"? And how do history and whiteness (and the
history of whiteness) inform rhetoric and composition studies? This
comment, the fortuitous moment of overhearing it, and my subsequent
questions have haunted me ever since, ultimately compelling me to write
this article, which proposes eavesdropping as a rhetorical tactic and then
employs it to investigate intersections of history , whiteness, and rhetoric.
In the United States, scholarly discussions of history and rhetoric
have rarely included whiteness as a principal object of analysis. Instead,
when rhetoric was first recovered for composition studies, rhetorical
theories were presented as ahistorical structures that could be lifted from,
say, fourth-century BeE Greece and dropped into, say, twentieth-century
U.S. politics in an effort to persuade, say, Southern Democrats to vote for
Richard Nixon (circa 1968) and George W. (circa 2000). The idea was that
rhetorical theories are timeless; the applications, time-bound. This idea
has been challenged by scholars, such as James Berlin, who have argued
that rhetorical theories are not timeless but are always grounded in the
sites of their origins (U5). This idea has also been challenged by
scholars-again, such as James Berlin-who have argued that rhetorical
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theories are always grounded in their sites of usage in ways that remake
the theories and make it impossible simply to transport those theories
unchanged from one site to another (116). Often such transformation is
posited as a potentially positive move. And rightly so. Note Susan
Jarratt's feminist transformations of sophistic rhetorical theory in Rereading the Sophists and Cheryl Glenn's feminist transformations of
classical rhetorical theory in Rhetoric Retold. But what happens when
change is not a positive move, when it is what John Poulakos calls
"dysfunctional" (90)? In other words, what happens when a transformation in a rhetorical theory denies the influence ofcultural categories, such
as whiteness? One answer is that such transformations circumscribe the
possibilities of rhetorical theories and rhetorical usages. 1
To avoid such circumscription, we must begin to factor whiteness into
our theories and praxes; but given the absence ofwhiteness in many ofour
disciplinary conversations, we may first need to define the term. In the
past decade, whiteness studies has emerged as an academic enterprise
attempting to articulate such a definition by critiquing how whiteness
functions both productively and dysfunctionally. 2 Despite the popularity
of whiteness studies, feminist and ethnicity scholars have questioned
whether it is really a forum for laying all our cultural cards on the table or
just a forum for rechanneling money and attention to white folks,
particularly the boys (Talbot 118). At its best, whiteness studies questions
the dominant culture's tendency to define race in binary terms ofblackl
white while only articulating blackness. Scholars working in this field
acknowledge that whiteness speaks as does the slash mark. And they
typically argue that because whiteness is impossible to understand apart
from its intersections with gender, class, age, and so on, whiteness
functions differently not just for people of color and for whites but also
for particular people whose lives may be shaped differently by each of
these categories of experience (Thompson 94).
Despite the recent emergence of whiteness studies, whiteness is
hardly a new topic. By necessity, people of color have been quite savvy
throughout U.S. history in articulating its power, privilege, and violence.
Most whites have refused to see it, let alone critique its dysfunctions. But
not all. In the 1940s, Lillian Smith named and critiqued whiteness in
Killers ofthe Dream, her autobiography of growing up white and female
in the South, and thereby kissed a writerly reputation goodbye-at least
for that particular moment. In the 1960s, Killers was embraced by the
Civil Rights Movement and reprinted; in the 1970s it was celebrated by
the white feminist movement; and, in the midst ofthe explosion of interest
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in whiteness in the 1990s (largely due to whiteness studies), it has been
reissued once again. What accounts for these different receptions? Not
Smith's "rhetorical stance" (Booth 111), not the "rhetorical situation" of
her audiences (Bitzer 6), not even their respective "discourse communities" (1. Harris 101-02). The difference lies in the circling of time-that
is, when bodies, tropes and cultures converge to make possible moments
of rhetorical usage. Only in these moments of convergence, when bodies
are troped and tropes are embodied, may personal and cultural change be
effected.
As I listen to echoes ofthe comment I overheard at the cocktail party,
it strikes me that one way to make possible these moments ofconvergence
is by what I will call rhetorical eavesdropping. More specifically, I make
four moves in this article: first, I redefine eavesdropping as an ethical
rhetorical tactic and posit it as a means for investigating history, whiteness, and rhetoric; second, I offer a mode of historiography, or thinking
about history, that shifts emphasis from origins to usage, foregrounding
how we may circle through history even as history circles through us;
third, I trace the trope of whiteness in the United States, not to provide a
comprehensive definition but to expose its dysfunctions; and, fourth, I
circle through history to argue that, within the United States, the dysfunctions of whiteness have remade rhetorical theory in ways that circumscribe available agencies.
The Rhetorical Tactic of Eavesdropping, Eavesdropping as
Tactical Ethic
As Lynn Worsham remarked in her response to an earlier draft of this
article, differences exist between accidental overhearing and purposeful
eavesdropping. Her remarks prompted these thoughts: if overhearing the
comment at the cocktail party was accidental yet productive, perhaps such
productivity could be more systematically tapped if purposeful overhearing, or eavesdropping, were imagined as a rhetorical tactic. But given the
negative connotations associated with eavesdropping, such a claim, at the
very least, raises questions of definition, justification, ethics, and pragmatics. In this section, I explore these questions in order to demonstrate
that eavesdropping may be employed effectively not only as a rhetorical
tactic but also as an ethical choice and thus a tactical ethic.
To define eavesdropping for rhetoric and composition studies, I want
to borrow one aspect of Mary Daly's method of "gynocentric writing"namely, uncovering potentialities in words by studying their dictionary
definitions, reworking those definitions, and excavating their etymolo-

90

jae

gies. The goal of Daly's method is to expose the gendered dismissal of
words and to mine their "obsolete" meanings (24). A common dictionary
definition of eavesdrop is "to listen secretly to the private conversation of
others" (Webster's New). This term has acquired a gendered connotation
that has associated eavesdropping with feminine busybodiness. Gladys
Kravitz, the nosy neighbor on Bewitched, is the perfect example of the
busybody and habitual eavesdropper. But a second hearing ofthe possibilities still contained within this term opens it up to the kind of redefinition that Daly calls for. Old English etymologies of eaves, for example,
suggest "edge" and "margin" and "border" (Webster's New; Oxford); an
archaic definition of eavesdrop suggests "to learn or overhear" (Webster's
Third); and a Middle English definition of eavesdropper suggests "one
who stands on the eavesdrop [the spot where water drops from the eaves]
in order to listen to conversations inside the house" (Random). Together,
these lexical threads weave a composite definition of eavesdropping that
may offer an effective rhetorical tactic: standing outside, in an uncomfortable spot, on the border of knowing and not knowing, granting others the
inside position, listening to learn. Through such a composite definition,
eavesdropping becomes not a gendered busybodiness but a rhetorical
tactic of purposely positioning oneself on the edge of one's own knowing
so as to overhear and learn from others and, I would add, from oneself.
Such a tactic is needed because in our daily exchanges we are too often
positioned like viewers of Bewitched: we are seduced into identifying
with the main characters of cultural discourses just as viewers are charmed
into identifying with Samantha and Darren. In The Other Side of Language: A Philosophy ofListening, Gemma Corradi Fiumara contends that
the "bewitchment of these authoritative voices appears to persist as long
as they address us directly" (58). But what if we position ourselves so that
these "authoritative voices" are not addressing us directly? What if we
position ourselves as eavesdroppers? In other words, what if we align
ourselves with Gladys Kravitz, granting her the presumption of truth
instead oflaughing at her? (She was usually right, you know.) When we
choose to position ourselves in such a way, we hear differently; and the
results may just be worthwhile. According to Fiumara, "listening creates
a minimal but fertile logical passage which will then allow our minds to
move with greater freedom and envisage still further ways of approaching
reality." Moreover, Fiumara claims, "the more one listens the more one
is absorbed by an awareness of the fragility of our [own] doctrines" (161,
191). In other words, rhetorical eavesdropping may be a tactic for
listening to the discourses of others, for hearing over the edges of our own
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knowing, for thinking what is commonly unthinkable within our own
logics.
In "Rhetorical Listening," I describe a process for listening to the
discourses of others that, first, acknowledges the existence of these
discourses; second, it listens for the (un)conscious presences, absences,
unknowns; and third, it consciously integrates this information into our
world views and decision-making (206). Rhetorical listening, as I define
it, must be considered alongside rhetorical eavesdropping because eavesdropping, as one kind of rhetorical listening, more sharply tunes listeners
into the "private conversation of others," conversations in which eavesdroppers are not directly addressed (Webster's New).
Eavesdropping as a rhetorical tactic raises questions about ethics
because it demands a consideration of how the self and other find a way
of being together in the world. The first ethical issue to consider is the
belief that eavesdropping is an invasion of privacy. The so-called common definition validates this belief; however, my reworked definition
makes this claim groundless, since rhetorical eavesdropping entails
positioning oneself to overhear both oneself and others, listening to learn,
and being careful (that is, full ofcare) notto overstep another's boundaries
or interrupt the agency of another's discourse. The second ethical issue to
consider is the danger ofromanticizing the outsider's position. Rhetorical
eavesdropping is not the rhetorical version of "slumming," which merely
reinscribes existing cultural positions. Rather, rhetorical eavesdropping
does not deny the very real power differentials of existing cultural
positions, but assumes that all cultural positions possess an inside and an
outside. The trick for eavesdroppers is to find an outside position where
they are not directly addressed. The third ethical issue to consider is one's
own willingness not just to eavesdrop but to hear. As Fiumara asserts, "in
our basic logic it is only possible to advocate an ethical attitude with
regard to something or someone who can say something to us, someone
who can make himself heard. And yet the point at issue is whether we
are capable of hearing a message and whether we select or predetermine what we hear" (61-62). Fiumara's claim warrants further reflection from all of us.
One path of reflection is pragmatic: how does rhetorical eavesdropping play itself out in daily life? A person may eavesdrop on him- or
herself, on other people's conversations, on written texts, on TV advertisements. The possibilities are endless. For example, when I talk to my
daughter in my mother's voice (double meaning intended), perhaps I
should mentally shift my rhetorical positioning and eavesdrop on myself
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from my daughter's point of hearing. When my students talk before class
about one of our readings (when they know I am in the room and can hear
them even though they are not directly addressing me), perhaps I should
eavesdrop and use their questions, concerns, applications as a way into
class discussion. When I read a scholarly text on an unfamiliar subject,
perhaps I should approach the text by trying to weave the edges of my
knowledge into the article's claims. And when I view a TV ad for a
political candidate I dislike, perhaps I should heed why its addressed
audience finds it so compelling. In each instance, eavesdropping may
enhance critical thinking by helping me better assess the situation.
Will eavesdropping work well in all situations? Will it work equally
well forpeople in all cultural positions? Will it expose that the unthinkab Ie
is always a better way of thinking? The answer to all these questions is
obvious: of course not. As with all rhetorical tactics, kairos factors into
usage. But eavesdropping as a rhetorical tactic possesses potential for
mapping common ground among people. In this way, it may be employed
generally as a tactical ethic; it may also be employed specifically here as
a rhetorical tactic to intervene in the structuring ofhistory, whiteness, and
rhetoric.
The Uses of History, History as Usage

The dominant narrative mode for thinking about history at this century's
end, at least in the United States, is an origins mode, one that begins at the
beginning (which is assumed to be obvious) and moves in a linear,
evolutionary progression. My undergraduate students deeply desire and
defend the origins mode, despite journalistic warnings about Gen-X's
social and economic regression. So do most members of the mainstream
culture. So, too, do some ofour histories ofrhetoric. James Berlin agrees:
"Our' official' histories ofrhetoric-the formulations ofGeorge Kennedy
(1980a) and Edward P.J. Corbett (1990) and Brian Vickers (1990) and
Wilbur Samuel Howell (1971), forexampl~epictrhetoric's historical
trajectory as a march of ideas, ideas characterized as unified, coherent,
and rational" (112). The appealing features of the origins mode are
obvious; the unappealing ones, less so. What gets displaced in the origins
mode is the presence ofthe past in thepresent--or, the then-that-is-nowand what gets further displaced is people's sense of accountability for the
then-that-is-now. Although rhetorical theorists have challenged the origins mode in order to rethink rhetorical history (for example, Victor
Vitanza's excellent collection Writing Histories ojRhetoric3), I offer yet
another challenge to the origins mode of historiography, one that fore-
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grounds our accountability for the then-that-is-now in our daily lives.
Drawing on the work of Martin Heidegger, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Toni
Morrison, I offer a mode of historiography that not only shifts our focus
from origins to usage but also demonstrates how we may eavesdrop on
history, circling through time in order to expose the circling oftime. Such
a mod~ will help me in the next section of this paper to analyze our
accountability for the rhetoric of whiteness.
In What Is Called Thinking? Heidegger ponders the connections
between the movement oftime, the movement ofthinking, and the sphere
oflanguage (what today we might call discourse). In Heidegger's view,
sometimes the "only way to go forward is to return to the origins and seek
a new beginning," and he believes that the vehicle for circling through
time is language-"that sphere in which man can dwell aright and make
clear to himself who he is" (Gray xxv; xix). Heidegger is obviously not
imagining time travel but mind travel-circling back to ''the origins" to
trace how a historical moment emerges, how it gets constructed, how it
becomes not just a past fact (something that happened) but a historical fact
(something that happened and is preserved within cultural discourses) (E.
Carr 10).

Heidegger's circling through time is exemplified in Du Bois' "Dialogue with a White Friend." In the following passage, Du Bois replies to
a fictional white friend's claim of white superiority:
You are obsessed by the swiftness of the gliding of the sled at the bottom
of the hill. You say: what tremendous power must have caused its speed,
and how wonderful is Speed. You think of the rider as the originator and
inventor of that vast power. You admire his poise and sang-froid, his utter
self-absorption. You say: surely here is the son of God and he shall reign
forever and ever.
You are wrong, quite wrong. Away back on the level stretches of the
mountain tops in the forests, amid drifts and driftwood, this sled was
slowly and painfully pushed on its little hesitating start. It took power, but
the power of sweating, courageous men, not of demigods. As the sled
slowly started and gained momentum, it was the Law of Being that gave
it speed, and the grace of God that steered its lone, scared passengers.
Those passengers, white, black, red and yellow, deserve credit for their
balance and pluck. But many times it was sheer luck that made the road
not land the white man in the gutter, as it had others so many times before,
and as it may him yet. He has gone farther than others because of others
whose very falling made hard ways iced and smooth for him to traverse.
His triumph is a triumph not of himself alone, but of humankind, from the
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pusher in the primeval forests to the last flier through the winds of the
twentieth century. (36-37)

This passage not only exemplifies Heidegger' s concept ofcircling through
time but also exposes the danger and difficulty ofcircling. The danger lies
in embracing false origins, such as the sled at the bottom ofthe hill. In this
instance, embracing false origins erases our knowledge of common effort
and hence undermines our imperative to work for the common good. The
difficulty lies in establishing true origins, such as the sled in the primeval
forest. If(and let me stress if) true origins exist as single causal phenomena, they may have occurred within our past but outside of our history, in
which case they are either forgotten or remembered today as myths,
legends, folklore, or speculation. As such, they may challenge the limits
ofour historical knowledge, but often they do not receive the same respect
as historical knowledge. If (and let me again stress if) true origins exist as
complicated, interwoven webs of phenomena, then they may be impossible to pinpoint exactly (read: empirically) (Mountford).
To sidestep this danger and this difficulty, let us shift our thinking
about history from origins to usage. Let us heed Heidegger's advice and
mind travel, but with a twist: instead of focusing on travelling back to a
moment oforigin, let us focus on traveling backfrom a particular moment
of usage. Travelling from a moment of usage, we may find ourselves
circling back through historical narratives, finding pertinent threads
(rather than origins in the traditional sense) and weaving our way forward
to our current moment. 4 This shift from origins to usage is more than the
rhetorical sophistry denigrated by Plato. It is the rhetorical sophistry
defined by Jarratt, a sophistry that links history to bodies, tropes, and
cultures, a sophistry that does not forsake truth and ethics but demands
their continual negotiation within different moments of usage (11-12).
What emerges if we lay this usage-based mode of historiography
(circling through time) alongside Toni Morrison's concept of "rememory"
(the circling oftime)? As depicted in Beloved, rememory represents the
embodied circling of time. It is an insidious embodiment for Sethe, the
escaped slave who kills her two-year-old daughter rather than let her be
taken back to the horrors of slavery on a plantation called Sweet Home.
According to Morrison's narrator, rememory is triggered for Sethe by a
smell, a sound, or a touch: "And suddenly there was Sweet Home rolling,
rolling, rolling out before her eyes, and although there was not a leaf on
that farm that did not make her want to scream, it rolled itself out before
her in shameless beauty" (6). In this way, rememory has an agency all its
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own. Rememory comes back whether or not Sethe wants it to return
(14)-sometimes falsely (6), sometimes releasing repressed memories
(61-62), but always serving as a testament to her seemingly infinite
capacity to hear bad things (70). Still, Sethe and other characters assert
some agency over rememory, at least for a while, via these coping
strategies: Sethe can "[beat] back the past" by kneading dough every
morning (73), by folding and double folding sheets (61), or by rubbing the
leg ofsomeone she loves (72); Paul D can "leave it alone" (71). But denial
and forgetfulness are ultimately impossible as well as dangerous. As
Sethe warns her daughter Denver, "If you go there--you who never was
there--ifyou go there and stand in the place where it was, it will happen
again; it will be there for you, waiting for you" (36). Ultimately, the
characters (and the readers) must wrestle with the past just as Sethe
wrestles with Beloved, who represents not only the ghost of Sethe 's longdead daughter but also the "sixty million and more" dead slaves to whom
Morrison dedicates her book. Readers learn what Paul D and Sethe learn:
to put our stories next to someone who "is a friend of [our] mind" and to
realize that we are our own "best thing" (272-73). This ethic oflove--both
love of others and love of self-tenders to us the agency necessary for
escaping the repetitive circling of denial and the idealized dreams of
forgetfulness. It offers a means of telling ourrememories as stories, using
them as a means of getting on with our lives. As represented in this novel,
Morrison's concept of rem emory exposes the past not simply as a series
of fixed points on an abstract historical continuum but rather as a series
of inscriptions in discourse and on our material bodies, inscriptions that
continually circle through our present and form our identities, inscriptions
that will control us if we do not acknowledge them and pass them on.
What emerges from placing a revised Heideggerian notion of circling
through time alongside Toni Morrison's rendering of the circling of time
is a sense of a past that haunts the present. This past is both a cultural
structure and an individual embodiment of that structure, with the
embodiment being different in different people depending on their
experiences with(in) the cultural structure. This usage mode ofhistoriography enables us to deal with the past so that it may strengthen us (like
Denver, we can walk off the porch). When we do not deal with the past,
it saps our strength, relegating us either to emotional prisonhouses (for
example, Paul D's rusty tin box of a heart) or to endless repetitions of the
moments that landed us here (for example, Sethe's rememories of Sweet
Home). When we change modes of historiography-that is, when we
reject the dominant (and oh-so-desired) origin-to-happily-ever-aftermode

96

jac

and embrace a not-so-dominant (and let's be honest, not-so-desired)

usage-as-ever-present mode-we (re)cognize that narratives of history
refuse to give up the ghost, so to speak, until (like Denver, Paul D, and
Sethe) we refuse to pass on them so that, in tum, we can gamer the strength
to pass them on. Such a (re)cognition of history enables us to eavesdrop
and circle through time to expose the circling of time. Thus, we find
ourselves accountable to ourselves and to others not for the then but for
the then-that-is-now.

The Trope of Whiteness, Whiteness as Embodied Trope
In the United States, one site of usage (and accountability) for the thenthat-is-now is the trope ofwhiteness. In this section, I first define the terms
trope and trope ofwhiteness; then I circle through history, eavesdropping,
to expose how this trope resonates at this particular moment of usage. I
will focus only on its dysfunctions as they are articulated by people of
color and by white people. Though by no means a comprehensive
discussion, what follows may help us analyze in the next section how
these dysfunctions remake rhetorical theory.
As we all know, tropes are figures of speech, such as metaphor,
metonymy, analogy, and aposiopesis. Although such tropes are sometimes defined as "the dressing ofthought" or as a deviation from ordinary
expression, they are much, much more (Corbett 459). Tropes designate
the movement ofa text, as when a prosecuting attorney employs a domino
analogy to simplify a complex web of causation. Indeed, tropes designate
the very movement oflanguage itself. Because all language is inherently
figurative (that is, because a term always signifies something other than
the term itself), all terms are tropes. Although tropes are terms within
discourse, the socially constructed attitudes and actions associated with
these terms become embodied in all of us (albeit differently) via our
socialization; for example, in the United States we are born into discourse
communities wherein the term student signifies certain attitudes and
actions about learning and classroom behavior. Once embodied, these
tropes, with their associated attitudes and actions, may (un)consciously
inform our own attitudes and actions. This chicken-and-egg cycle continues in perpetuity, with discourse socializing people and people accepting,
resisting, and revising this socialization via discursive practices.
Like any other socially constructed category (student, teacher, dean,
gender, race, class), whiteness is a trope, and the actions and attitudes
associated with this trope are embodied in all of us (albeit differently) via
our socialization. The real issue, however, is what we do with this trope
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and its embodiment, both culturally and individually. Academic whiteness studies attempts to answer this question. For example, in How the
Irish Became White, Noel Ignatiev explores Irish immigration to the
United States in the nineteenth century and describes his project as
follows: "This book looks at how one group of people became white. Put
another way, it asks how the Catholic Irish, an oppressed race in Ireland,
became part ofan oppressin~ race in America" (1). On the productive side
of this process, the Irish, ir becoming white, could "sell themselves
piecemeal instead of being sold for life, and later they could compete for
jobs in all spheres instead ofbeing confined to certain work"; indeed, Irish
men (though not Irish women) could begin taking advantage of the full
rights of citizenship (2-3). The dysfunctional side of this process (in
addition to the aforementioned gender bias) is that in becoming white, the
Irish did not alter the cultural structure of oppression but managed instead
literally to work themselves into the racial category of privilege, thereby
reinforcing already existing oppressive patterns for those still categorized
as nonwhite (for example, American Indians, Chicanos(as), African
Americans). Is Irish assimilation more complicated than what can be
explained through a focus on economics and whiteness? Yes, it is
complicated by factors such as the nation's industrial status, religion,
regional politics, and the like. But Ignatiev's point is well-taken: whiteness is a crucial factor in the process of assimilation and socialization.
As a trope, whiteness designates both people and practices.s Yet, as
AnnLouise Keating reminds us, a "conditional" relationship exists between white people and white practices. That is, while not everyone can
be classified as a white person, everyone can perform white practices
(907). Performing whiteness is a very visible practice for people of color.
"Acting white" on the job or in school may gamer promotions or good
grades (or, in the case ofa comedy routine by Paul Rodriguez or Chris
Rock, lots oflucrative laughter). But acting white in homes and communities may gamer charges of betraying one's roots. Conversely, performing whiteness is often an invisible practice for white people who assume
their own thinking and acting to be the norm. Like any trope, whiteness
is historically and locally grounded, always already evolving and open to
multiple interpretations. But as Ruth Frankenberg reminds us, in the
United States whiteness has consistently signified privilege-a privilege
that fosters stasis by resisting and denying differences (236-37).6 Historian David Roediger explains: "Whiteness describes, from Little Big
Hom to Simi Valley, not a culture but precisely the absence of culture. It
is the empty and therefore terrifying attempt to build an identity based on
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what one isn't and on whom one can hold back" (Towards 13). In short,
whiteness is typically defined in terms of what it is not-not African
American, not Latina, not Chippewa, and so on.
As a trope that fosters stasis by resisting and denying differences,
whiteness has very real implications in everyone's daily life. People of
color have astutely observed these implications in their struggle to
survive. Some whites have also done so, by choice, in their effort to move
politically and ethically against social injustice. But when most whites are
asked what it means to be white in the United States, they simply stare
blankly. Either they have never thought about it (because they don't have
to) or they are afraid of answering for fear of being associated with
extremist racist organizations, such as the KKK, that have for too long
claimed whiteness as their own turf and defined it in their own terms.
Notable exceptions are Frankenberg and Roediger, as well as Smith,
whose Killers of the Dream predates the current whiteness studies
movement yet provides an admirable model for naming and critiquing
whiteness.
People ofcolor claim that whiteness signifies in myriad ways, ranging
from acting white to terror. The core ofthis terror-white violence and its
effects on everyone--is captured in Claude McKay's poem "The Lynching," which describes a lynched black man as a "swinging char," a
"ghastly body swaying in the sun" (11.8, 10). It describes white female
observers as: "never a one / Showed sorrow in her eyes of steely blue; /
And little lads, lynchers that were to be, / Danced round the dreadful thing
in fiendish glee" (11. 11-14). In "Representations of Whiteness in the
Black Imagination," bell hooks argues that such representations of terror
emerge not just from African Americans' stereotypes about white people
but also from African Americans' ethnographic observations of white
people. Such observations have often functioned as an African American survival strategy throughout U.S. history-from centuries of
slavery to contemporary prison demographics, welfare reforms, corporate glass ceilings, even unwelcoming classrooms (39-40). To deal
with this then-that-is-now terror, hooks offers a simple yet difficult
strategy: understanding how whiteness functions culturally without resorting to an essentialized us-versus-them mentality that plays into the
white desire for stasis. Her strategy is one that both she and a white male
friend have employed: "Understanding how racism works, he can see
the way in which whiteness acts to terrorize without seeing himself as
bad, or all white people as bad, and all black people as good" (49).
Many people of color also claim that whiteness signifies the drive to
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consume others' lands and cultures. Ethiop (William J. Wilson) describes
how white consumption functioned in the United States in the nineteenth
century: "Restless, grasping, unsatiated, [whites] are ever on the lookout
for not what is, or ought to be theirs, but for what they can get" (59). Alice
Walker exposes the white consumption implicit in a "melting pot"
mentality, which she believes is actually a way of normalizing difference
in terms of whiteness. She makes this claim in "The Dummy in the
Window: Joel Chandler Harris and the Invention of Uncle Remus,"
written in 1981. She argues that, by inserting Uncle Remus into the Brer
FoxlBrer Rabbit stories, Harris robbed her of her heritage: "How did he
steal it? By making me feel ashamed of it. In creating Uncle Remus, he
placed an effective barrier between me and the stories that meant so much
to me, the stories that could have meant so much to all of our children, the
stories that they would have heard from their own people and not from
Walt Disney" (239). And this white consumption is what encourages
Lyman Lamartine, a Chippewa entrepreneur in Louise Erdrich's Love
Medicine, to ponder turning the tables on white people by opening a bingo
palace: "He'd ... teach Chippewas the right ways, the proper ways, the
polite ways, to take money from retired white people who had farmed
Indian hunting grounds, worked Indian jobs, lived high while their
neighbors lived low, looked down ornevernoticed who was starving, who
was lost" (327). Ironically, Lyman suggests a recycled white consumption in order to counter white peoples' consumption of his ancestors' land
and culture, and he justifies his own consumption in terms of prior
ownership privileges and fairness.
Many people of color have also associated whiteness with hypocrisy,
especially religious hypocrisy, as when people profess Christian principles yet practice racism. In "The Color of Heaven," historian Mia Bay
exposes this hypocrisy when researching nineteenth-century white
slaveowners' conceptions of heaven and finding it to be a "racially
divided place" (69). And Martin Luther King, Jr. pinpoints this hypocrisy
in "Letter from Birmingham Jail," addressed to eight white clergy in
Alabama: "I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the
Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the
White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to 'order' than to justice; who prefers a negative
peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the
presence of justice" (892).
People of color have also associated whiteness with a denial of race
issues, a denial stemming from fear and guilt. In "White Man's Guilt,"
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James Baldwin maps the interrelated web of denial, fear, and guilt: it "is
heard nowhere more plainly than in those stammering, terrified dialogues
which white Americans sometimes entertain . . . the black man in
America. The nature of this stammering can be reduced to a plea. Do not
blame me. I was not there. I did not do it" (321-22). Yet, according to
Baldwin, "on the same day, in another gathering and in the most private
chamber of his heart always, the white American remains proud of that
history for which he does not wish to pay, and from which, materially, he
has profited so much" (322). By abating fear and guilt, denial creates a
safe space in which white America may live without having to confront
its past. 7 In his essay, Baldwin exposes the dominant either/or logic
haunting whiteness in this country: either whiteness has perpetuated great
violence, or it has fostered great accomplishments. There is little room in
anyone's mind for a both/and logic, even though it may just be the ground
needed for initiating genuine dialogue.
People of color have also linked whiteness with an ignorance ofother
cultures, although they may disagree about what this ignorance signifies.
In Amy Tan's The Joy Luck Club, Rich, the good-hearted white boyfriend
of Chinese American Waverly Jong, arrives at her parents' home with a
bottle of French wine, but Waverly's parents do not own wine glasses; he
also calls them Tim and Linda (theirnames are Tin and Lindo) (196, 198).
Tan's point is that whites are often ignorant not just of other cultures but
also oftheir own ignorance ofother cultures. Morrison sees this ignorance
in literary studies less as an unconscious phenomenon than as a "willful
critical blindness" (Playing 18). And in Massacre ofthe Dreamers, Ana
Castillo (Chicana poet, fiction writer, and theorist) does not let whites off
so easily: "The ignorance of white dominant society about [Chicana]
ways, struggles in society, history, and culture is not an innocent and
passive ignorance, it is a systematic and determined ignorance" (5).
People of color have not always been alone in disclosing the meaning
of whiteness. In Killers ofthe Dream, Smith makes visible the convergence of bodies, tropes, and cultures. She also makes visible the intersections of multiple tropes (race, gender, class, region, sex), a move much
heralded by 1990s feminists of all races:
I shall not tell, here, of experiences that were different and special and
belonged only to me, but those most white southerners born at the tum of
the' century share with each other. Out of the intricate weaving of
unnumbered threads, I shall pick out a few strands, a few designs that
have to do with what we call color and race ... and politics ... and money
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and how it is made ... and religion ... and sex and the body image ...
and love ... and dreams of the Good and the killers of dreams. (27)
Smith's ellipses are just as important as her terms. The ellipses invite
readers to pause and contemplate each term individually (for example,
"color and race," then "politics"); they also invite readers to link the terms
together metonymically; and they invite readers to fill the gaps with their
impressions of "white southerners born at the tum of the century" as well
as with their own experiences and definitions.
From her standpoint as a mid-century, upper-middle class, Southern
white woman, Smith identifies the white "terror" not just with "the Ku
Klux Klan and the lynchings I did not see" but also with "the gentle backdoor cruelties of 'nice people'" (12). Smith in no way implies that her
experiences of white terror are comparable to the experiences of those
lynched; however, she does analyze its influence on her own body and
moral consciousness:
The mother who taught me what I know of tenderness and love and
compassion taught me also the bleak rituals of keeping Negroes in their
"place." The father who rebuked me for an air of superiority toward
schoolmates from the mill and rounded out his rebuke by gravely
reminding me that "all men are brothers," trained me in the steel-rigid
decorums I must demand of every colored male. They who so gravely
taught me to split my body from my mind and both from my "soul," taught
me also to split my conscience from my acts and Christianity from
southern tradition. (27)
Smith also analyzes the influence of this white terror on everyone else's
body and moral consciousness and on the culture they all share:
Something was wrong with a world that tells you that love is good and
people are important and then forces you to deny love and to humiliate
people. I knew, though I would not for years confess it aloud, that in trying
to shut the Negro race away from us, we have shut ourselves away from
so many good, creative, honest, deeply human things in life. I began to
understand slowly at first but more clearly as the years passed, that the
warped, distorted frame we have put around every Negro child from birth
is around every white child also. (39)
In her analysis, Smith employs a usage-based circling through time to
expose the circling of time in her own body: "I am afraid this book has
played tricks on me: I am caught again in those revolving doors of
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childhood" (13). When writing, she grounds herself in her current
moment, picking out "threads" from the past that still haunt her in order
to explain her present. Her circling of time exposes her (and our)
responsibility for the then-that-is-now. Smith explains: "We know White
Supremacy is indefensible in today's world, we know that as an idea it is
dead, but the bitter struggle goes on, ... wasting minds and time and hearts
and economic resources, tying us to a past where ghost battles ghost. And
while this happens the human spirit sits on the rim of things, waiting"
(235). This ghostly battle represents the dichotomy of real and ideal that
pervades racialized (and gendered and classed) discourses in the United
States. And "so we stand," Smith says, "tied to the past and clutching at
the stars!" (253).
Before we can untie ourselves from the dysfunctional realities ofthe
past and the dysfunctional idealizations of the present, we must make (at
least) two moves. First, we must make visible and/or audible the reality
of the then-that-is-now. Smith tried to do this in 1949. Academic whiteness studies is attempting to do it now. For example, Lynn Worsham's
"After Words" weaves her per~onal stories of performing whiteness into
a critique of the discourses and cultures surrounding us. Second, we must
stop hiding behind the ideal of color blindness. In addition to academic
whiteness studies, some popular publications are attempting to do this
too. For example, in a recent biography of Vince Lombardi, which lauds
his anti-racist work while he coached the Green Bay Packers, author
David Maraniss claims, "It has always been easy for whites to claim [the
ideal of] color blindness in the United States since white is the dominant
color in American society, but the claim often serves as a ruse for not
recognizing the [real] obstacles faced by non-whites" (8). In other words,
in academic and popular discourses, we must investigate whiteness,
eavesdropping within history, so that bodies, tropes, and cultures may
converge in moments of productive rhetorical usage, moments when
personal and social change may be achieved.

The Agencies of Rhetoric, Rhetorical Agents
Discussions of history and whiteness are significant for rhetoric and
composition because they invite, among other things, questions of ethics
and agency. According to Lawrence Buell, "ethics has gained new
resonance in literary studies," and, consequently, literary scholars are
rethinking agency in its various guises-discursive agency, authorial
agency, readerly agency, and sociopolitical (or cultural) agency (7, 1214). I would extend Buell's claim to rhetoric and composition. Rhetorical
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studies (in all its multiplicity) is the site where discursive, authorial,
readerly, and sociopolitical agencies have been kept in play and their
intersections have been duly noted-even when biographical criticism
privileged the author, New Criticism privileged the work, deconstruction
privileged textuality, reader response criticism privileged the reader, and
cultural studies privileged class. Indeed, ifwe associate discursive agency
with tropes, authorial and readerly agencies with the body, and
sociopolitical agency with culture, what emerges is not a battle for which
site possesses agency but rather a question ofhow the agencies ofdifferent
sites converge to produce moments of rhetorical usage.
When I circle through history, at this moment, eavesdropping to trace
how the dysfunctions of whiteness remake rhetorical theory and usage, I
find that these four agencies are not simply concepts lifted from classical
times and dropped into our lives; rather, they are concepts remade in the
image of their moments of usage. In the twentieth century, for example,
the whiteness-that-fosters-stasis has worked to circumscribe all four of
these agencies. Granted (and this is an important point), whiteness is not
the only force at work in this circumscription, but it has definite vested
interests. What follows is an attempt to articulate some of these interests.
Inspired by Jacqueline Jones Royster's "When the First Voice You Hear
Is Not Your Own" and Kathleen Welch's "Interpreting the Silent' Aryan
Model' of Histories of Classical Rhetoric," the following comments also
invite more such work to be done.
As a practice of discursive agency, the whiteness that desires stasis
also encourages the denial of language play. Ana Castillo describes the
performance of this denial as follows: "Word-play for the Mexican
Spanish speaker is contagious, a reflection of our sense of irony and
humor about life. . .. In attempting to do this with English dominant
speakers-especially, but not exclusively white people-I am always
disappointed to see that the unimaginative way they have been taught to
hear language makes a complete disaster of my attempt at 'word-play'"
(168). This denial suppresses the tropological functions oflanguage, and,
by extension, it constrains the ways bodies, tropes, and cultures are
imagined to converge. Let me offer four examples.
First, the practice of whiteness-that-denies-Ianguage-play signifies
an (un)conscious desire for closure in mythmaking and storytelling. As
Leslie Marmon Silko claims, white culture foolishly tries to freeze frame
stories to preserve them forever: "The folks at home [Laguna Pueblo] will
say, 'Ifit's important, ifithas relevance, it will stay regardless ofwhether
it's on video tape, taped, or written down.' It's only the western Europeans
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who have this inflated pompous notion that every word, everything that's
said or done is real important, and it's got to live on and on forever. And
only Americans think that America ... [will] just continue on" (qtd. in
Barnes 52). This particular practice ofwhiteness reinforces the separation
of whites from people of color, story from history, poetics from rhetoric.
Second, the practice of whiteness-that-denies-Ianguage-play erases
how blackness participates in the formation of whiteness. In "What
America Would Be Like Without Blacks," Ralph Ellison explains:
"Much of the sound of [U.S.] language is derived from the timbre of the
African voice and the listening habits of the African ear. So there is a de'z
and a do 'z of slave speech sounding beneath our most polished Harvard
accents, and if there is such a thing as a Yale accent, there is aNegro wail
in it-doubtlessly introduced there by Old Yalie John C. Calhoun, who
probably got it from his mammy" (164). This practice of whiteness
reinforces the dominant culture's tendency not to hear or listen to other
cultures (especially women's voices) as well as its tendency to inflate its
own autonomy and importance.
Third, the practice ofwhiteness-that-denies-language-play also erases
how whiteness participates in the formation of blackness. 8 In Beloved,
Stamp Paid brilliantly articulates for Paul D how whiteness inscribes
blackness: "It wasn't the jungle blacks brought with them to this place
from the other (livable) place. It was the jungle whitefolks planted in
them. And it grew. It spread ... until it invaded the whites who had made
it. ... Changed and altered them. Made them bloody, silly, worse than
even they wanted to be, so scared were they of the jungle they had made.
The screaming baboon lived under their own white skin; the red gums
were their own" (198-99). As Stamp Paid implies, this practice of
whiteness essentializes blackness and whiteness as biological destiny; it
also obscures their status as tropes and ignores power differentials
between definers and defined as well as the potential oflanguage use for
personal and social change.
Fourth, the practice ofwhiteness-that-denies-language-play not only
effaces "colors" other than black and white but also hides the slippage of
these categories of color. Cherrie Moraga's commentary on "lightskinned breeds" exposes these effaced colors and the slippage between
categories:
With a Black lover in apartheid Boston I was seen as a whitegirl. When
we moved to Brooklyn, we were both Ricans. In Harlem I became
"Spanish." In Mexico, we were both Cubans. With my brown girlfriends
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we be brown girls sitting on brownstones. We be family. Among Indians
in the States I'm a half-breed who looks like every other breed, colored
mixed with cowboy.... Among Chicanas, I am everybody's cousin
Carmen. Whitegirls change my shade to a paler version. People think I'm
Italian, Jewish. (232-33)

Finally, despite this slippage, the practice of whiteness-that-denieslanguage-play blinds and blindsides people by offering them socially
constructed concepts, such as race and gender, presented as The Truth.
Smith concretizes this claim when discussing the politicians of her
childhood: "The singsong voices of politicians ... [were] telling us lies
about skin color and a culture they were callously ignorant of.-lies made
of their own fantasies, of their secret deviations-forcing decayed pieces
of theirs and the region's obscenities into the minds of the young and
leaving them there to fester" (12-13). According to Smith, these festering
obscenities exist both on "semantic" and "somatic" levels; in other words,
bodies are troped and tropes are embodied9 (130, 161).
Fighting these festering obscenities is doubly difficult when
tropological functions of language are placed in the background. Language becomes literal, in the service ofThe Truth; language play becomes
suspect; rhetorical negotiation is deemed dubious; and the possibilities of
discursive agency are thereby limited. Also limited are possibilities we
ascribe to authorial, readerly, and cultural agencies. To counter such
limitations, teacher/scholars in rhetoric and composition studies must
think seriously about how the tropological functions oflanguage connect
to our concepts of truth/Truth, knowledge, and belief. We also must
integrate our thinking consciously into our theories and praxes, including
our pedagogy. Too often these concerns hover atthe edge of our thinking
and doing, unspoken and unheard. For example, consider our injunction
to students to "write clearly." As a trope, write clearly needs to be more
fully interrogated. Scholars, teachers, and students all must ask: (1) what
writerly and cultural attitudes and actions are associated with the trope
write clearly?; (2) what benefits (there are many) are associated with it?;
and (3) what gets lost in our stated and implied definitions of clear
writing? (For example, clearly signifies differently in different discourse
communities.) Such attention to language provides a means of questioning discursive agency and an opportunity to articulate authorial agency.
As a practice of authorial agency,10 whiteness (in its desire for stasis)
encourages what Nedra Reynolds calls the reduction of our concept of
ethos to a concept of individual ethical appeal ("Ethos" 327-29). As
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Reynolds shows, Aristotelian ethos is not merely the "ethical appeal" of
an individual but is "a shared enterprise among members ofthe community" with the community deciding "what constitutes justice, temperance,
bravery, or ethics" (328). In the United States, we typically reduce ethos
to individual ethical appeal, metonymically linking it to rugged individualist ideology. This ideology is haunted by the ghost of St. Jean de
Crevecoeur's 1782 American, a white male of European descent who
succeeds on the basis of individual will and toil (7, 9). De Crevecoeur's
description, along with other texts (both legal and literary), led Morrison
to conclude that while American has been presented as an inclusive term
it has often played out as a code for white male (Playing 39-44). Following
Morrison's logic, the ethos ofthe rugged individualist in rhetorical theory
must be understood as the narrow and exclusionary ethos of the rugged
white male individualist.
Limiting our concept of ethos to individual ethical appeal may work
for de Crevecoeur's American because it is tailor-made in his own image.
(To identify the then-that-is-now, we need look no further than presidential wanna-be Donald Trump.) But this limited sense of ethos does not
always work for those falling outside of de Crevecoeur's category. A
concept of ethos that celebrates individual will and toil ensures that
"falling outside" will be interpreted in only one way: as failure of
individual will and toil. Sometimes it is such a failure, but not always.
Note, for example, the effects of falling outside of Milwaukee Public
Schools' desegregation plan. A former MPS board member recentlywell, finally-admitted that the court-ordered school desegregation plan
of the late 1970s ''was setup for 'white benefit' at the expense ofAfricanAmerican children" and their communities (Williams At). In practical
terms, this admission calls attention to the fact that white students stayed
in their home communities unless they chose to attend magnet schools in
African American neighborhoods, but African American students were
compelled to attend outlying area schools. NAACP volunteer and school
board member, Joyce Mallory, explains the consequences:
What really hurts now is when I look at all these kids in prison, a lot of
that is the result of thousands of kids not getting a good education and
being forced, pushed and dropped out ofMPS in the last 20 years .... A
lot of them dropped out because going to the Pulaskis, the Bay Views, the
Hamiltons and the Madisons of this community weren't places where
they could be educated in a climate and an environment that valued who
they were as individuals. (qtd. in Williams AS)

Krista Ratcliffe

107

When, as in the MPS example, the actual individual does not mesh with
the existing cultural category of individual, "falling outside" may result
from factors other than individual will and toil. But reducing ethos to
individual ethical appeal occludes these other factors-what Reynolds
calls the "spatial and social" dimension of Aristotelian ethos ("Ethos"
327),11 what Buell calls readerly, discursive, and sociopolitical agencies
(12-14), and what I call the convergence of bodies, tropes, and cultures.
To combat this costly reduction, we must foster an expanded concept ofethos.
The possibilities of an expanded ethos may be seen by examining the
reception of Smith's text. In 1949, Killers was given a decidedly chilly
reception, which disciplined not just Smith but other white writers.12
In 1994, Killers was received more favorably. 13 Ifwe work from a reduced
concept of ethos-one that is limited to individual ethical appeal-we
might argue that only individual writers and speakers are responsible for
their reception (for example, we might blame Smith for the chilly
reception in 1949 and praise her for the warmer one in 1994). But if we
work from an expanded concept of ethos-one that acknowledges its
individual, discursive, and cultural components-we might argue that
negative reception, such as Smith's initial reception, may represent a
convergence of bodies, tropes, and cultures for an individual author but
a failed convergence for the dominant white culture. We might also argue
that successful reception, such as Smith's recent reception, represents a
more successful convergence within the dominant white culture. While
this expanded ethos rejects the possibility that ethos functions only as an
individual enterprise, it retains the possibility that ethos emerges as a
result of rhetorical negotiation in which speakers and writers are active
agents (albeit with discursive and cultural limitations) in the dance of
bodies, tropes, and cultures.
As a practice ofreaderly agency, whiteness (in its desire for stasis)
reinforces rhetorical theory's tendency to relegate readers to secondary
importance in the making of meaning. Contrary to the prevailing viewwhich holds that Aristotle's rhetorical theory uses audience as its foundational category for classifying speeches and audience members (Rhetoric
1.3.1358b.1-5), and that his concept of enthymeme invites audience
members to insert their own ideas into the orator's gaps (2.23. 1400b.2535)--1 want to propose that enthymemic gaps are ones that the speaker/
writer purposefully employs so that audience members will feel smart,
concur with the argument, and believe they are full partners in the making
of meaning so that the speaker/writer's will may be realized without (too
much) resistance. As Michelle Ballif claims, rarely do rhetorical theories
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(or speakers or writers) ask, "What is it that the audience wants" or desires
or demands or needs? (51).
Because whiteness is embodied differently in white people and
people of color, whiteness socializes us all into different secondary
positions of readerly agency. According to Castillo, white socialization
gives white readers certain expectations: they expect to be included in a
text "in a direct way, ifnot as subjects, then emotionally. Otherwise, they
are disinterested, and even feel threatened when excluded" (17). Whether
white readers accept or resist this socialization is for each to negotiate.
According to Royster, white socialization gives readers of color different
expectations, especially of white speakers and writers: "I have been
compelled to listen to speakers, well-meaning though they may think they
are, who signal to me rather clearly that subject position is everything. I
have come to recognize, however, that when the subject matter is me and
the voice is not mine, my sense of order and rightness is disrupted. In
metaphoric fashion, these 'authorities' let me know, once again, that
Columbus has discovered America and claims it now, claims it still for a
European crown" (31). But just as European crowns may be overthrown,
readerly agencies haunted by whiteness may be circumnavigated.
Castillo, Royster, and Smith all offer critical readerly agencies for
circumnavigating whiteness and its haunting legacy. Castillo's is the most
drastic. She chooses to express authorial agency by not addressing white
people directly. In Massacre of the Dreamers, she writes,
I AM A BROWN WOMAN....
Throughout the history of the United States "I" as subject and object
has been reserved for white authorship and readership. However, when
I speak of woman within these pages, I speak very specifically of the
woman described above .... (This also holds true for the use of the word
men, children, people, and so on. I refer at all times to Chicanos/asmejicanos/as unless otherwise specified). (1)

Castillo offers brown women readerly agency by saying, in effect, "At
last, you are the subject-enjoy." But she carefully qualifies her claim:
"Non-white readers" in the United States are "not asserting that our
perspective is the only legitimate one, that it is superior to or should
replace, repress, or censure others. What we are conscious of is that our
reality is vastly different from that of the dominant culture" (5). Castillo
likewise offers white readers a form ofreaderly agency that in effect says,
"Get over it, but keep reading (eavesdropping)." She believes that
Chicana struggle "is relevant to anyone trying to understand the world he
or she lives in" (17). She does not position whites as subjects or even invite
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them emotionally into her world; she therefore potentially proves her
point about white readers' expectations each time one resists her. Thus,
Castillo challenges white readers to critique not only her claims but also
their own reactions to her claims.
Royster's model of critical readerly agency offers all readers a more
rhetorically (and emotionally) complicated positioning. In "When the
First Voice You Hear Is Not Your Own," she demonstrates how two or
more people may interact so as to approximate equal positioning:
My experiences tell me that we need to do more than just talk and talk
back. I believe that in this model we miss a critical moment. We need to
talk, yes, and to talk back, yes, but when do we listen? How do we listen?
How do we demonstrate that we honor and respect the person talking and
what that person is saying, or what the person might say if we valued
someone other than ourselves having a turn to speak? How do we
translate listening into language and action, into the creation of an
appropriate response? How do we really "talk back" rather than talk also?
The goal is not, "You talk, I talk." The goal is better practices so that we
can exchange perspectives, negotiate meaning, and create understanding
with the intent of being in a good position to cooperate, when, like now,
cooperation is absolutely necessary. (38)

This listening model of readerly agency imagines a readerly agency that
is inextricably intertwined with discursive, authorial, and cultural agencies. 14 Instead of submitting to traditional rhetorical moves in which
authorial agency tries to control readerly agency, Royster offers the
possibility of both agencies functioning as subject positions, with everyone rotating in and out of each position, assuming respect for the process,
the people, and each other's subject positions.
Finally, Smith posits a model of critical readerly agency that demonstrates the interactions of one person's many voices. Her readerly agency
is also intertwined with discursive, authorial, and cultural agencies: "I was
in dialogue with myself as I wrote, as well as with my hometown and my
childhood and history and the future, and the past" (13). And, as Smith
notes, this readerly agency has ethical dimensions:
Our big problem is not civil rights nor even a free Africa-urgent as these
are-but how to make into a related whole the split pieces of the human
experience, how to bridge mythic and rational mind, how to connect our
childhood with the present and the past with the future, how to relate the
differing realities of science and religion and politics and art to each other
and to ourselves. Man is a broken creature, yes; it is his nature as a human
being to be so; but it is also his nature to create relationships that can span
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the brokenness. This is his first responsibility; when he fails, he is
inevitably destroyed. (21)

Although this vision may seem utopian (and haunted by apocalypse), it is
a possible ethical choice with material consequences. Note its then-thatis-now echo in Victor Villanueva's Bootstraps: "Change is possible, I
believe. Language used consciously, a matter of rhetoric, is a principal
means-perhaps the means-by which change can begin to take place .
. . . It's a utopian hope .... The utopian, I know, drives me, even when
tempered by the practical" (121). And mention of "the practical" leads
us directly to issues of cultural structures that must be negotiated.
As a practice of cultural agency, whiteness (in its desire for stasis)
occludes the influence of cultural structures-such as race, gender, class,
and the like-on everyone's life, rendering these structures either invisible or apparently unimportant. By now we can all rehearse the Marxist
maxim that the most ideologically entrenched position is the one that
appears invisible, unimportant, or natural. Smith concretizes this naturalizing process in terms of the cultural structures of her own life and times:
"Southern Tradition taught well: we learned our way oflife by doing. You
never considered arguing with teacher, because you could not see her.
You only felt the iron grip of her hand and knew you must go where all
the other children were going. And you learned never, never, to get out of
step, for this was a precision dance which you must do with deadly
accuracy" (96; emphasis added).
How does the practice of whiteness (in its desire for stasis) participate
in this occlusion of cultural structures? Through denial. This practice of
whiteness, which Baldwin claims denies race, further complicates that
denial with other intersecting denials. For example, Villanueva's critique
of how people of color are positioned within academia and the dominant
white culture shows how ethnicity is complicated by a denial ofclass: "It's
hard to discuss the class system in America, because for so long we
believed that ours was a classless society. John Kenneth Galbraith
believes that most Americans still hold to the notion and cites George
Bush as saying that class is 'for European democracies or something
else-it isn't for the United States of America. We are not going to be
divided by class '" (56). In a critique of our field's reception ofnineteenthcentury black women, Shirley Wilson Logan shows how ethnicity is
complicated by a denial of difference within the category of gender.
Logan speaks through Marsha Houston to remind us that "women of color
do not experience sexism in addition to racism, but sexism in the context
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o/racism; thus, they ... bear an altogether differen t burden from that borne
by white women" (46). No doubt we could all list examples of denied and
occluded cultural categories, such as age, religion, political affiliation.
But the point is this: by denying the role of cultural structures in the
construction of identity, whiteness perpetuates a theory and practice of
what Villanueva calls "bootstraps" (xiv, 121). Are these denials and
occlusions of cultural agency the result of a grand conscious conspiracy?
Not exactly. If they were, they might be easier for insiders to see and for
everyone to resist. The denials exist, the occlusions occur, and the status
quo remains, because, like the segregating signs on the water fountains of
Smith's childhood, whiteness is often taken "for granted" (57).
Thus, one means of resistance is to stop taking whiteness for granted.
Again, Smith's receptions exemplify this point. In 1949 Smith's authorial
agency alone could not guarantee a positive reception of her book.
Though body, trope, and culture had converged in 1949 for Smith and
other people in a way that allowed them to see and to critique whiteness,
they had not yet converged in the majority of white bodies or dominant
discourses of white culture. As Smith notes, "The quickest way for a
writer to be banned as an Outsider ... was for him to seek new words, new
ways of interpreting the earth-shaking hour we live in" (224). No matter
how carefully she had crafted her authorial agency, the dominant discursive, readerly, and cultural agencies worked against her. Yet, Smith's
experience is not the occasion for despair or the rationale for a retreat into
gradualism. It is a model for how a resisting agency may challenge other
agencies haunted by whiteness.
In sum, whiteness (in its desire for stasis) celebrates a discursive
agency in which language is made literal, an authorial agency in which
ethos is reduced to individualism, a readerly agency in which readers are
relegated to secondary importance in the construction of meanings, and
a cultural agency in which the influence of cultural structures on identity
is occluded. Such a practice of whiteness puts authorial agency on a
pedestal, subordinates the other three, and denies the intertwining functions of all four. Can the aforementioned dysfunctions be challenged in
terms of how they remake rhetorical theory and rhetorical usages? As I
have tried to demonstrate, some people have done so and, indeed, are
doing so. As for the rest ofus, a pertinent response maybe heard in Smith's
conclusion (though it obviously does not address this question directly):
"We have the means, the technics, we have the knowledge and insight and
courage. All have synchronized for the first time in history. Do we have
the desire? That is a question that each ofus must answer for himself' (253).
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(In)Conclusion

What evidence attests that the current convergence of bodies, the trope of
whiteness, and mainstream U.S. culture is not a momentary anomaly?
Within academic culture, there is whiteness studies. Within popular
culture, there is Maraniss' biography ofLombardi. There is even the white
guy at the CCCC convention cocktail party. Was he being snide or simply
jocular when he claimed that it is hip to be a white guy again? To be honest,
when I overheard his remark, I could not tell. But whether or not I am able
to discern his intent is little cause for concern. As Reynolds reminds us,
Aristotle, in one of his finer moments, says that '~e become just by doing
just acts" (qtd. in "Ethos" 328). Perhaps the cocktail party guy will
accidentally overhear himself and, as a result, embody the trope of
whiteness in ways that will help him understand his accountability for the
then-that-is-now. Perhaps he already has. Such are the possibilities of
rhetoric.
But whether or not the cocktail party guy accidently overhears, or
purposefully eavesdrops on, himself, we should eavesdrop on him-and
then act on what we hear. Such are our challenges as scholars and teachers.
As scholars, we must reflect on the influence of whiteness in our
discipline, our professional journals, our conventions, our books and
articles, our professional networks, and, dare I say, even our friendships.
As teachers, we must introduce students to rhetorical tactics that will
enable them to reflect on the influence ofwhiteness in their own lives and
cultures. Many tactics are available. For example, Susan Jarratt offers
rereading (xxiv); Cheryl Glenn, remapping rhetorical territory (1-17);
Roxanne Mountford, resisting empiricism; Jackie Royster and Joyce
Middleton, listening (Royster 38); Michelle Ballif, speaking as a listener
(59); Nedra Reynolds, interrupting ("Interrupting" 70-1); Diane Davis,
hearing alnew; Shirley Logan, speaking the unspeakable (55); Ellen GilGomez, piece-making (204); Lynn Worsham, composing storied cultural
critiques (336-46). To that list, I add eavesdropping. By living and
teaching such tactics in ways that are pertinent for our particular locales,
we remind ourselves and our students that even as history, whiteness, and
rhetoric encircle us, we have access to agencies (admittedly in varying
degrees) for circling through them,lS
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
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Notes
1. Poulakos provides one answer to this question by invoking a Nietzschean
critical historiography: "The critical conception of the past operates from the
assumption that much of what the past has produced is dysfunctional and useless
because it was not, indeed, it could not have been, produced with our present
predicament in mind. Therefore, if we are to place history in the service of our
life [a Nietzschean imperative], we must rid ourselves of the burdens of the past
and strive to create from them materials that are useful, that augment our
capacity to live joyfully" (90). Poulakos' source for this critical historiography
is Nietzsche's "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," which
posits three kinds of history-monumental, antiquarian, and critical (72-76).
(I'd like to thank Michelle Ballif for referring me to these sources.)
2. For landmark research associated with the contemporary whiteness
studies movement, see Allen; Dyer; Fine, et a1.; Frankenberg; Hill.
3. For other challenges to the origins mode of historiography, see Jarratt's
feminist sophistic historiography (10-12) and Vitanza's Nietzschean (sophistic)
"sub/versive" rhetoric ("Notes" 100-01, 106-14).
4. Rich's description of the poetic moment also explains why the convergence of body, trope, and culture is often interpreted as a moment of origin: this
convergence is "the crossing of trajectories oftwo (or more) elements that might
not otherwise have known simultaneity. When this happens, a piece of the
universe is revealed as iffor the first time" (8; emphasis added). Her "as if'
exposes that what we name moments of origin are actually moments of usage,
which (given our deep desire for origins) are often received as if they were
origins.
5. One important white institution is law. As C. Harris argues, within the
legal system whiteness emerges as property: "Whiteness-the right to white
identity as embraced by the law-is property ifby property one means all of a
person's legal rights" (105).
6. People of color have also been aware that whiteness represents privilege.
Powell claims that the use of the term "'white privilege' is a redundancy [since]
Whiteness has always signified worthiness, inclusion and acceptance" (qtd. in
Roediger, Black 100).
7. In Massacre ofthe Dreamers, Castillo concretizes this safe space in terms
of writing. Quoting Ivan Argiielles, she claims that white writing is "evocative,
finely crafted, witty, urbane, sophisticated, occasionally troubling, but always
safe ... sometimes politically correct, but sanitized and with only faint airbrushed innuendos of anger" (168; emphasis added).
8. Another example of how whiteness informs blackness is played with in
Rogers' "Debating the Senator" (1917), in which a black pullman porter informs
a white segregationist Senator from Oklahoma that
"The word, slave, has a white origin."
"A white origin!"
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"Yes, sir, it comes from 'Slav,' a very white-skinned people who were
reduced to slavery by the Germans...." (98)
9. Smith demonstrates the "semantic" level of discursive socialization
when she describes how adult white Southerners ofa certain class denigrate their
childhood love for the black women who cared for them by naming these women
"nurses" and then tearing up at spirituals for the rest of their lives instead of
continuing a caring relationship with these women (130). Smith demonstrates
the "somatic" level of discursive socialization when she describes how Southerners use language (she implies but never states the n-word) to dehumanize
African Americans andjustitY whites' physical torture of them. This socialization is played out on both black and white bodies, obviously with very different
results (161).
10. I use Buell's term "authorial agency" to signify positions of production
(i.e, speaking and writing), and I use his term "readerly agency" to signify
positioris of reception (i.e., reading and listening). While I recognize that these
forms of agency interact, I also think the power differentials of these positions,
as they play out in U.S. culture, are worth exploring separately.
11. Reynolds reminds us that the community in which Aristotle was writing
precluded the partiGipation of women and slaves within communal decisionmaking ("Ethos" 329). Consequently, even ifit were possible, simply lifting the
theory and dropping it into our lives won't work. We must remake it for our own
historical moment.
12. Gladney explains the silencing of Smith in 1949: "Although Strange
Fruit [an interracial love story set in the South after World War I] brought Smith
international acclaim and greatly expanded her sphere of influence as a social
critic, Killers of the Dream ... affronted too many southerners-including
powerful moderates-to be financially or critically successful. After an initial
30,000 copies, sales dropped dramatically, and when reviewers and critics
refused to accord it critical notice, Smith was effectively silenced as a writer .
. . . This 'subject matter and Smith's innovative style were met with hostility, or
deliberate silence, by the literary establishment, the New Critics, and the general
public of Cold War America" (iv).
13. lit 1994 not only was Killers reviewed but Smith was hailed by critics
as "original and insightful" (Hobson 756), as "bold and honest" (778-79), as
"one of the most important white civil rights figures of her time, virtually alone
among white Southern 'liberals' in condemning gradualism in all of its forms
and in calling for an immediate end to institutionalized segregation in the interest
of all Southerners, white as well as black" (Watson 470). Also see C. Carr and
Romine.
14. Two other responses to Royster's question "How do we listen?" may be
found in Ballifs and Ratcliffe's articles on listening.
15. My thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their rich suggestions for
revision, and especially to Lynn Worsham for her comments on eavesdropping.
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